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SPEECH  TO  THE  INSTITUTE  FUR  AUSLANDSKUNDE,  MUNICH, 
9th MARCH, 1978 
by  Christopher  TUGENDHAT,  Member  of  the  Commis~ion 
Communities, 
"EUROPE:  IDEALS  AND  MONEY" 
I  come  before you very conscious of being a  foreigner 
Who  cannot  even speak your  language.  Yet  I  also  come  here 
acutely aware  of being personally affected by,  and involved 
in, what happens  in Germany.  For  though  I  am  British - and 
fiercely proud of being so  - I  am  also a  citizen of the 
European Community.  And  there is no  Membe~ of the 
Community  that has  a  more  decisive influence upon·its 
destiny,  and  thus upon.the  lives of all its citizens, 
than the Federal Republic of Germany. 
One  of the  things  that  I  wish  to  do  tonight is to 
outline to you what  I  believe West  Germany'~ contribution 
to  the Community has  been.  But  I  do  not  intend  to restrict 
myself  to delivering a  richly deserved  testimonial  to  the 
remarkable  and beneficient role which  your nation has 
played in the evolution gf the  Community  in the past.  I 
also want  to discuss  the  change  in,present attitudes that 
will be necessary in many  of  the Member  States if the 
Community  is to continue  to make  progress in the future. 
And  I  should make it plain at the outs.et  that  I  include 
Germany  among  the nations where  such  a  change is now 
urgently needed. 
*  *  *  *  * West  Germany's  Achievements 
The  accomplishments  of  the Federal Republic in the 
last thirty years make  Germany  the success  story of post-
war  Europe,  both in political and  economic  terms. 
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The  credit for this achievement rests above all with  . 
the remarkable  qualities of  the  German  people in general 
and of their post-war political leaders in particular. 
The  appalling conditions in which  the Federal Republic 
was  founded made  the success of that venture anything but 
inevitable.  Physical devastation,  economic  coll~pse, 
political chaos  and  the  imposed partition of your country 
were  scarcely circumstances which  dictated the  triumph of 
liberal democracy  and  the construction of one  of  the 
constitutional shopieces  of  the Free World.  Nor  did those 
grim circumstances render inevitable  the  combination of 
that political achievement with  Germany's  astounding 
economic  success.  Only  the character and  the determination 
of  the  German  people and their leading statesmen made  these 
triumphs  possible. 
The  effort and  the  skill which  the citizens of your 
country  h~ve brought  to  the  task of-building a  nation anew 
has  brought  them great rewards  - the blessings of internal 
stability,  the  enjoyment of extensive civil liberties,  a 
very large measure  of material prosperity,  and  a  place of 
honour  and considerable influence  among  the nations of  the 
world. 
But  the benefits  ./. But  the benefits flowing  from  the Federal Republic's 
political and  economic  "miracle" have not been confined 
within her frontiers.  The  rest of  post-war Europe is 
massively indebted to you on  two  separate counts. 
First, Europe  owes  you gratitude for  the inspiration 
which it has received from your political success.  The 
prodigious feat of constructing liberal institutions in the 
difficult conditions  to which  I  have referred,  and  then 
maintaining those institutions despite all the problems 
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that inevitably arise from West  Germany's  geographical  location 
on  the  extreme perimeter of  the Free World,  has  given 
-
invaluable encouragement  to democrats  on both  sides of  the 
Iron Curtain. 
In the Free West your  success has  helped other nations 
experiencing difficulties of their own  not  to despair 
prematurely of liberal and  democratic institutions:  the 
knowledge  that  such institutions can survive and flourish in 
the face of  the  awesome  challenges  to which  Germany  has 
responded  so  courageously makes  it much  less  tempting for 
other countries  to  conclude  that their own,  often less 
formidable,  problems  can only  be  resolved if the civil liberties 
of their citizens are diminished or eliminated. 
For those who  live on  the other.side of  the  Iron Curtain 
the  example  of  the Federal Republic's political institutions 
has if anything even more  significance.  Because yours is 
the  democracy  physically nearest to  the  Communist  East,  its 
liberal institutions,  and way  of life act as  the  sharpest 
continuous  reminder available  to  the victims of Communism 
of both  the possibility and also  the advantages  of  freedom. 
Here  in Bavaria  ./. 4 
Here  in Bavaria you have particular reason to know 
just how  powerfully  the superiority of  ~he Western way  of 
life impresses itself upon the minds  of your Eastern 
neighbours.  For not far away  is the frontier over which 
so many  of  them cross,  or try to cross, at great risk to 
their  live~,, in order that they  too may  enjoy its benefits. 
Germany's  role in the creation of  the  Community 
If one  reason which many  have for gratitude towards  the 
Federal Republic is  the inspiration they have  received from 
her su€cess,  another is the way  in which ·Germany  has made 
use of  the  strength which  success has  conferred.  And  here 
of course  I  am  thinking in particular of  the crucial paut 
which  she  played in the foundation of  the  Community,  and of 
the very impressive manner in which  she has  subsequently 
supported it, oft.en in very trying circumstances.  In this 
context  there is, of  course,  one man  who  deserves particular 
credit,  namely  Konrad Adenauer,  surely one of  the greatest 
statesmen of  the post-war world.  That well  known  Bavarian, 
Mr  Franz Josef Strauss,  who  was  a  member  of his government, 
prov~des us with a  link with his achievements. 
Since  the creation  ./. -----------------------------
Since the creation of  the Community,  the Federal 
Republic has  proved one of its sturdiest pillars.  I 
do  not have  time  tonight  to catalogue all the ways  in 
which  Germany.has  given Europe  sustenance at every  stage 
of its evolution.  But  I  would like to refer to  one 
specific contribution about whose merits  I  am  inevitably 
biased.  I  refer to  the Federal Republic's  consistent 
support often against strenuous  opposition for Britain's 
accession.  The  binding of Britain to Europe  for  the 
purposes of systematic peace-time collaboration is a 
step of  immense  significance~ reversing a  trend in 
British history which has  endured for over a  thousand 
years.  Although Britain's accession has unquestionably 
created some  difficulties for  the  Community,  there can be 
no  doubt  that it has also greatly increased Europe's 
potential strength.  I  hope very much  that'that potential 
will  be realised. 
The  present state of  the  Community 
5 
I  want  now  to  turn-· from  the Federal Republic's  record 
with ·respect to  the  Community  in the past and  to  concentrate 
instead upon  the state of the  Community  today  and its 
prospects ·of  progress  tomorrow. 
There  can be  no  gainsaying./ 6 
There can .be  no  gainsaying that at present there is, 
throughout  the  Community  a  strong sense of disenchantment. 
In particular there is a  feeling that the  Community  has 
thus  far achieved very little of practical significance. 
And  this inevitably leads  some  to  question whether it is 
worth continuing to devote  substantial effort and  resources 
to what  they fear will be  a  largely futile effort to  secure 
Europe's further development. 
But is profound disillusion really the appropriate 
reaction to what  Europe has  so  far accomplished?  One  of 
the greatest problems  of politics is that people  tend  to 
take  success for granted,  and  to  concentrate instead upon 
real or alleged failures.  And  with respect to  Europe, 
public attention seems  to be irresistibly drawn  to  the 
discrepancy between  the aspirations of  the Founding 
Fathers  on  the  one hand,  and  the present reality of  the 
Community  on  the other  - to  the  complete  exclusion of 
everything else. 
Yet not  to have  translated into practical effect 
every detail of  the Founding Fathers vision is not necessarily 
to have failed.  For  one  thing the  Community  is only  twenty 
years old - a  fleeting instant in the life of a  continent  -
and  the radical redirection of  the  course of European 
history which is the  Community's  central purpose must in 
the nature of  things  take  a  considerable  time. 
For another  ./. 7 
For another,  not all the details - as dis.tinct from 
the underlying principles  - of  the Founding Fathers'  original 
plans for  the future of Europe are still appropriate 
objectives.  The  degree of progress  towards  achieving  them 
is not  therefore always  an appropriate yardstick of  success 
or failure. 
The  Community's  achievements 
I  am  not contending that when it is measured by 
realistic and appropriate yardsticks  the  Community's 
record is beyond reproach.  unquestionably,  there are 
legitimate grounds  for disappointment with  the snail's 
pace that has  characterised the  development of  Community 
action in many  areas  of  considerable contemporary  importance. 
But having acknowledged  that,  I  would also like to remind 
you of  some  of  the  Community's  unsung -or at least rarely 
sung  - successes. 
The  most historic of  these  - and  perhaps also  the least 
remarked upon  - is the  extraordinary and  profound reconciliation 
that has  taken place  since  the  last war between France  and 
Germany.  The  Community  cannot of  course  claim the  sole 
credit for this startling transformation in the relationship 
between  two  traditionally bitter foes  - a  transformation 
whtch has  made_  another major war·between  the nations of 
Western Europe virtually unthinkable.  But  cooperation 
between France  and  Germany  within the  framework of  the 
Community's  institutions has  done much  to  strengthen the  deep 
understanding and  amity which  now  exists between  them. 
Another  ./. Another achievement which may  not be as remarkable as 
the first, but is nonetheless  immensely beneficial and  too 
often taken  for granted,  is the construction of a  Customs 
Union between the nine.Member States.  When  that objective was 
originally set it seemed very great,  and the fact that we  now 
take it for granted  shows  how  easily the achievements of 
yesterday become  commonplace  today.  , 
Today,  as in the past,  the  Community  is moving  fonvard. 
This is  pe~haps most  obvious  in the external  sphere.  To  take 
only  ~he latest. example) the Member  States are now  to a  very 
large  ..  degree dealing with Japan on a  Community  basis with the 
I 
Commission as an interlocutor.  In my  view this is an important 
\. 
development.  Moreover,  it is interesting to note that there 
I 
is no  difference on this score between those governments  ~vhich 
I 
take a  restrictive view of hm-7  the .Community  should develop,  and 
those who  want  to  see  sovereignty pooled more .quickly.  Both are 
increasingly taking the view that the problems of gaining access 
to  the Japanese market and of preventing unfair Japanese 
competition in our markets  can best be tackled on a  Community 
rather than on a  purely national basis. 
I. 
-
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.What  is the reason for this?  The-answer is well  illustrated 
by  st~el and  text~les,  two  once great industries  in difficulties 
•  1  •. 
all over  Europe.  For both the  Community  has negotiated agreements 
with the countries that export these commodities  to us  that are 
~idely acknowledged  to be more  favourable  than the Member  States 
could have obtained separately. 
./. These external  arrangements  provide  the shield behind 
Which  the  Community  has  the opportunity, which·it must 
grasp,  of restructuring and modernising industries that are 
currently uncompetitive internationally.  Europe's industrial 
problems  are very great,  but it would be infinitely more 
difficult to tackle  them on  a  purely national basis without 
the protection and assistance afforded by the  Community. 
Whatever its shortcomings  then  - and no  member  of  the 
Commission is going  to  deny  their number or their seriousness  -
the  Community  has much  to be  proud of,  and its citizens much 
to  be  grateful for.  It is essential that all those dedicated 
to  the  European ideal seize every opportunity to point this 
out.  For otherwise misplaced  cynicism and despair will  continue 
to  sap  the foundations  of  the Whole  enterprise~ 
The  decline of  idealism 
But  the Community  is not only being  threatened by  a 
loss of confidence in its capacity  to  evolve further;  it 
is also in danger of being undermined  by  another and  even more 
destructive change in the way  its Members  look at it. 
In the early days  of  the  Community  - the days  when  men 
like Konrad Adenauer,  Jean Monnet,  Alcide di Gasperi, 
Robert  Schuman  and Walter Hallstein bestrode  the centre of  the 
stage,  the  approach of  the Member  States  towards  Europe was 
informed  by  an·impressive  sense of high moral  purpose. 
John F.  Kennedy's  celebrated injunction to  the individual 
citizen,  "Ask not what  your country can do  for you,  but ask 
instead what  you  can do  for your country",  was  one which  the 
government of  the original Six can truly be  said to have 
applied to their Community. 
Unhappily  ./. -------------------------------~----~~~~-
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Unhappily,  however,  the exhilarating  ent~usiasm 
and refreshing idealism evinced at that time have not been 
sustained.  There is now  a  g~owing tendency  on the part of 
Member  governments  - particularly the  Governments  of  the 
larger countries  - to  think in terms  not of what  they  can 
contribute to the  Community  but only of what  advantage  they 
can extort from it. 
All· the Member  States are  to  some  extent culpable in 
this respect.  And  I  would like to state very emphatically 
that  I  do  not consider that the Federal Republic is by  an~ 
means  the worst offender.  But  since  I  am  in Germany,  and 
since also  I  am  an admirer of Germany's,  who  is, as  I  have 
explained,  acutely aware  of  the critical significance of 
what happens  in Germany  for  the fortunes  of  the rest of  the 
Community,  I  will refer primarily tonight to German  examples 
of  the attitude of mind  I  have  described. 
Germany's  contribution to  the  Budget 
Perhaps  the  two  most  striking features  in the current 
discussion of  Community  matters in the media  and  elsewhere 
in the Federal Republic are first the constant emphasis  upon 
the fact  that Germany  contributes more  than any other Member 
State to what is alleged to be  a  grossly distended Community 
Bud~et;  and,  second,  the  almost equally constant complaint 
about how  little Germany  receives in return for undertaking 
the  burdensome role of  the  Community's  paymaster. 
How  far  ./. 11 
How  far is comment  of this kind  justified?  Certainly, 
as  the most  prosperous Member  State,  Germany  does  have  to 
finance  a  significantly lar&er proportion of  the  Community 
Budget than any of her partners.  Certainly,  also,  Germans 
have  every right to be watchful  that the  large  sums  they 
contribute to  the  Community  are put to  the best possible use. 
Apd  as  the  Commissioner responsible for  the  Budget,  I  am  very 
aware  that one  can question whether  this is always  so at 
present. 
Nonetheless,  I  regard the manner in which many  in Germany 
currently discuss  the  Community  Budget with deep  concern.  For 
one  thing,  I  deplore  the frequent assertion that the  Community 
Budget  should be  subject to  the same.disciplines as  national 
budgets.  That  the  Community  Budget  should be  subject to 
discipline  I  fully agree.  But  the  comparison with national 
budgets is fallacious.  National  budgets have  been built up 
over many  years  and  cover a  vast range  of  the administrative 
and direct services which modern  governments  - it is true with 
different degrees  according to  the country  - are now  expected 
to  supply.  They  c~ver a  wide  range of different areas  of 
activity,  and have  a  very.large administrative content.  It 
.is possible to  find. sums  for new  policies by relatively marginal 
adjustments in the overall total.  The  Community  Budget,  on 
the other hand,  is very small- only·some  2.5%  of national 
budgets in the·Member States, or- to  take  a  local  example-
about  the  size of the  Budget of  the  Bavarian Land.  And  of  this, 
almost  three-quarters goes  on one  single policy  - agricultural 
intervention expenditure.  Such  a  budget,  which accurately 
and appropriately reflects  the Community's  immaturity allm.vs 
v~ry little scope for flexibility in the search for resources 
to develop  new  actions. 
It is clear  ./. 12 
It is clear,  therefore,  that if the Community  is to 
develop policies and  programmes  outside the agricultural field 
its budget must  grow more  rapidly  than national budgets.  Such 
programmes  are badly needed both  to  enable action to  be  taken 
at the Community  level  towards  reducing unemployment  and 
restructuring uncompetitive industries and  to assist the 
process of European integration. 
To  say this is not to preach indiscipline in the  growth 
of the Community  budget.  The  European Commission with whom 
most  proposals for increased Community  expenditure originate 
understands very well  the inflationary dangers of excessive 
public expenditure  and  bears  this very much  in mind when 
formulating its own  proposals. 
One  objective we  must bear in mind  therefore when 
envisaging new  Community  actions is that an increase in 
spending at Community  level need not  - and,  unless  the  case 
is demonstrated,  should not  - entail an increase in total 
public expenditure at all levels.  For  the  Community  does  not 
exist to duplicate  the activities of  the nation states, 
though it may  on occasion_ - like steel and  textiles  - need  to 
reinforce  them,  if only  temporarily.  Rather,  its purpose is 
to perform those  necessary  tasks which  can be fulfilled more 
effectively by  common  action at a  supra-national  level  than 
by·individual nation states acting separately.  Such  a 
purpose  implies not  the  creation of additional  layers of public 
sector activity,  but rather the  transfer of certain 
responsibilities in spending  programmes  from national  to 
Community  level. 
Indeed  ./. 13 
Indeed,  far from increasing total expenditure,  such  a 
transfer may  actually reduce it.  Expenditure on research 
into advanced  technology,  for instance,  can become  very much 
cheaper if common  action replaces  the duplication of work 
programmes  in several national  laboratories. 
It should be noted,  in a  more  distant perspective,  that 
it has  been estimated that the  Community  Budget  could sustain 
an economic  and monetary union,  of the kind for which  the 
Commission is now  campaigning,  if it-was increased to  o~y 
about  5  - 7%  of Community  GNP  and  that such an increase  ~n 
the  Community  Budget  could imply  an increase in total public 
expenditure at all levels of  the  Community  of only about  l%of 
GNP. 
If there is widespread misunderstanding about  the  Community 
Budget,  I  know  nevertheless  that there are many  in Germany  who 
appreciate  the points  I  have  been making.  This  is true of 
none more  than the  three  German  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament's Budget  Committee,  Herr Lange,  its Chairman, 
its 
Herr Aigner,  the well-known Bavarian who  is/Vice-Chairman&also 
Chairman of  the Sub-Committee  on Financial  Control,  and 
Herr Bangemann.  All  three,  with their colleagues,  make  a 
notable contribution to  the work o'f  the  European Parliament 
which,  as  the other half of  the  Community's  Budgetary 
Authority with  the Council  of Ministers,  is called upon  to 
discuss  these matters also. 
If we  turn  ./. If we  turn from  these general considerations  about 
the size of the  Con~nity Budget  to Germany's  contribution, 
I  should stress that the  system of financing  the  Community 
Budget  so laboriously worked out is carefully designed 
to enable each Member  State to contribute roughly according 
to its economic  strength.  Criticism that concentrates 
exclusively upon  the fact  that the Federal Republic  pays 
more into the  Budget  than any other Member  State may  lead 
Germans  to delude  themselves  into  thinking that  they  alone 
have  to make  sacrifices.  Indeed,  in per capita terms  Germany 
actual}:y gets  away  more  lightly than  some  other Member 
States.  In 1977,  Germany's  contribution to  the  European  Budget 
cost each individual  German  citizen an average of  DM  149. 
The  equivalent figure for  Belgium was  DM  192  and  for Holland 
it was  DM  205. 
A further reason for deploring  the way  in which  the 
Community  Budget is too  often discussed in Germany  is 
equally fundamental.  It is that once  a  Member  State starts 
to  think of  the  Community  Budget  in terms  of  the  size of its 
financial  return,  the relationship between that Member  State 
and  the  Community  stands in danger·of being  stripped of an 
essential  element.  In sinking their differences,  in pooling 
their strengths for  the  common  purpose of building a  new 
and better Europe,  the nine Member  States are  engaged upon 
an historic venture with a  much  higher objective  than can 
be measured in narrowly  defined  terms  of national balance-sheets. 
And  the whole  venture is threatened if any  of  the  Community's 
Member  States allow themselves  to forget  that this is so. 
During  the referendum./. During  the  referendum campaign in the  United Kingdom 
in 1975,  I  and others  campaigning for  a  "Yes" vote were 
frequently  asked why  Britain should stay in the  Community 
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if this meant  that food  prices would  be higher than outside. 
The  answer we  gave  - the  answer  that was  overwhelmingly 
endorsed by  the  referendum's  result -was that the  Community 
was  about much  more  than certain food  prices  and  questions  of 
agricultural  trade. 
That membership  of  the  Community  implies  a  willingness 
sometimes  to  subordinate  considerations of immediate national 
economic  advantage  to  a  broader and  longer term purpose is 
something which  I  think is still widely understood in Germany, 
perhaps more  so  than in many  other parts of  the  Community. 
But it is a  truth from which undue  attention upon the ratio 
between national  receipts from  and national  payments  into 
the  Community  Budget  can too  easily deflect attention with 
damaging  consequences. 
Moreover,  such  arguments  tend  to concentrate on  the 
narrow budget flows.  It must not be forgotten that many 
economic  benefits flow from  the  Community  which  do  not pass 
through  the  Budget.  A strong industrial state, highly 
dependent  on exports,  such as  the Federal Republic,  has 
a  major interest in the maintenance of free  trade in the 
countries  to which most of its exports  go.  Some  40%  of 
Germany's  exports are sold to other Community  Member  States 
and  Germany's  prosperity is thus  very dependent  both on 
continued and uninterrupted access  to  the markets  of  the 
other Member  States  and  on their prosperity. 
Another  point  ./. ·------~------------------~~-~~~----· 
Another point that is often forgotten is that 
Germa~y's industry enjoys  a  particular advantage  from 
its proximity to  the richest markets  of  the other Community 
countries.  Again,  that is hard to evaluate but one has  only 
to think of how  much  easier it is to deliver to France, 
Holland,  Belgium and  Denmark  from  the principle industrial 
regions of Germany  than it is from other less well  placed 
locations,  to understand  the force of this point.  Perhaps 
you in Bavaria are particularly able  to  appreciate this. 
Common  Agricultural Policy 
Moreover,  though  Germany  is traditionally seen elsewhere 
as  an industrial power,  agriculture is a  major  sector - and 
Germany  is a  substantial beneficiary from  the  Community's 
CAP  - not  so much  through the budget as in more  general  i:erms. 
I  should also like to discuss  this situation - and  the rather 
contradictory anxiety frequently voiced in Germany,  namely 
that the  Common  Agricultural Policy costs  too much. 
Before proceeding further,  let me  immediately affirm 
my  unequivocal  support  ~9r  t~e basic principles of  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy  - principles of which  another celebrated 
Bavarian,  Herr Ertl, is so  doughty  a  champion.  In a  world 
threatened by  a  massive  population explosion, it is essential 
that we  give  to  the  Community's  farmers  - and of course 
Bavaria,  Which  possesses  some  3.8 million hectares of farmland, 
and provides  a  quarter of  the Federal Republic's  food  supply, 
is one of the  Community's  most  important farming  areas  - the 
support and  the incentives  to produce which  the  CAP  provides. 
We  must  equally ensure for all our citizens  security of  supply 
and stability of price,  on a  wide  range  of agricultural 
products. 
At  present  ./. At  present agriculture is the internal activity in 
which  there is  the most  thorough  going  Community  policy.  As 
such it is a  corner stone of the  European construction.  I 
would wish it to remain  so  - and with it a  substantial 
expenditure policy.  But  a  building needs more  than one 
corner stone.  ·As  I  have  already said,  I  would like to  see 
Community  spending policies  extended and initiated in other 
appropriate areas.  As  that happens  the  proportion of  the 
Community  budget  accounted for by  agriculture is bound  to 
diminish. 
Quite apart from  this it is, as all those who  wish  to 
curb public expenditure will agree,  unquestionably  the  case, 
that the continuous  growth of  CAP  expenditure,  which  in 
ll 
1977  accounted for over three-quarters of  the  Community  Budget 
must  be  checked.  Since 1973 expenditure  on  the  FEOGA 
guarantee section has  grown  by  over  80%.  This  was  an increase 
in real  terms  of about  3.5%  a  year.  Milk has  on average 
accounted for about  35%  of guarantee  expenditure.  The  1978 
estimate for butter storage alone  exceeds  the appropriation 
for  payment under  the Regional  Fund.  The  cost of  the  sugar 
sector has  trebled since 1973,  while  the cost of MCAs  is 
six times  as  higho 
It is against this background  that Chancellor Schmidt 
has referred to what he calls the "massive misguidance"  of 
resources  that the  CAP  in its present form entails. 
What,  however,  many  in Germany  allow themselves  to forget 
is that the German  Government  itself carries  a  large part of 
responsibility for  the manner in which  CAP  expenditure  continues 
remorselessly to rise and  that Germany's  farmers  are  among  the 
major beneficiaries. 
By  far  ./. 18 
By  far the greater part of  CAP  expenditure arises in 
those sectors where we  have  the largest surpluses:  milk, 
sugar,  cereals,  and  to a  lesser extent,  beef and wine.  Some  of 
these surpluses have until now  been only  temporary  phenomena; 
not  so  long ago  there were  world  shortages of beef; sugar and 
cereals.  For milk,  however,  there has been a  consistent surplus 
currently equivalent to nearly  15%  of production,  and  this 
sector alone now  consumes  27%  of  the Community  Budget. 
Furthermore,  analysis of  the  long-term trends  suggests  that 
structural surpluses of  a  similar nature are in store in other 
sectors  too. 
Many  people are surprised to  learn that the lion's share 
of many  of  these  surpluses are now  held in Germany;  73%  of 
the Community's  butter stocks  and  61%  of  skimmed  milk powder 
stocks  are found  there.  22%  of  total intervention purchases 
of beef have  taken place in Germany  since July 1973  and  Germaay 
now  holds  37%  of total remaining stocks.  As  for  thore surpluses 
which are exported,  Germany  also accounts  for her fair share: 
e.g.  20%  of the  Community's  sugar exports  last season. 
There  can be  no  doubt  that one of  the main  causes  of  this 
state of affairs has  been-the more  favourable  price levels 
guaranteed  to  German  farmers,  compared with  their colleagues 
in other Member  States,  as  a  result of  the green currency 
system.  The  German  Government has  persistently refused to 
accept any revaluation of  the green Mark which was  not  accompanie 
by  a  corresponding increase in common  prices,  thereby at least 
maintaining the price  to  German  farmers  in DM.  At real rates 
of  exchange,  support prices in Germany  are currently  35%  higher 
than in France,  40%  higher  than in the  UK  and 20  % higher  than 
the average  Community  level of price support. 
1~t  the  same  time  • I . At  the  same  time,  prices paid for  soy~, fertilisers, 
tractors and other equipment  - all of which are bought in 
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real money  rath~r than "green money"  - are much  lower relative 
to  the prices received for· the final  product in Germany.  than 
in other Member  States.  It has  been argued;  for example,  that 
to buy a tractor a.German farmer needs  to  produce 47.6  tonnes 
of wheat,· whereas  a  French farmer  needs  to produce  85  tonnes 
of wheat. 
It is of course true  that  the price increases received 
by  the German  farmer have  been lower  than  those  r~ceived by 
producers  elsewhere in the  Community;  but  then the rate of 
inflation has  also. been much  lower.  In real  terms,  the  German 
farmer has  consistently done  better,  or suffered less  than 
most other Community  farmers.  The  result has  been greatly 
increased output and higher levels of self-sufficiency.  Overall, 
during  the period 1966-70,  Germany  was  on average  87%  self-
sufficient in common  wheat and  sugar and  just self-sufficient 
in butter.  The  most recent figures  suggest  that Germany  is 
now  completely self-sufficient in wheat,  while her production 
of sugar exceeds  consumption by  10%  and butter production 
exceeds  consumption by  37%.  Similar increases in self-
sufficiency· can be  observed for practically all other products 
covered by the MCA  system,  while  German  exports of beef in 
the first eight months  of  1977  were an estimated  35%  higher 
than in 1976. 
These increases,  which are  the result of  the  German 
Government's  deliberate policy,  are in those  products  already 
in or tending  to surplus,  which  carry such heavy  costs for 
the  Community  Budget  • 
Ironicallv  I Ironically, it is by  no means  certain that this 
policy of high prices for  German  farmers,  through high 
common  prices and  an artificially undervalued green Mark, 
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in fact benefits  the  German  economy.  It is increasingly 
argued by  German  economists  that for  Germany,  as  a  net 
agricultural importer with  a  comparative advantage in 
industrial production such  a  policy involves  serious resource 
misallocation. 
But whether or not  the  CAP  in its present shape is of 
real economic  benefit to Germany,  it certainly behoves her 
Government  not simultaneously to criticise its cost on  the 
one hand,  and  to pursue policies which increase those costs 
on  the other.  The  criticism I  welcome,  but let it be 
accompanied in the future  by action to restrain the rate of 
increase in the prices ot surplus  products  and  by other 
means  of  containing the  total level of  spending in this  sector. 
Rekindling idealism 
I  have  spoken strongly.  I  can assure you however  that 
I  do  so  elsewhere  - especially in my  own  country. 
The  reason  ./. ----.....----------------------
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The  reason  I  feel  obliged to  do  so is that  I  believe 
that present attitudes are inflicting great damage.  The 
further progress of  the  European cause will be  possible only 
if we  succeed in rekindling a  sense of European purpose 
among  Member  Governments,  and  the electorates to which  they 
are responsible.  If the  European ideal is to  survive and 
be  strengthened,  those of us who  believe in Europe must 
ceaselessly draw attention to  the  harm that is being done  by 
the posture  towards  the  Community  which far  too many  now 
adopt.  It is after all a  paradox,  and  none  too flattering 
a  comment  on human  nature  that as  the peoples of Europe 
have  become  more  prosperous  they have at the  same  time  seemed 
less,  rather than more  'l'.villing  to  join in common  endeavour 
for a  higher goal. 
Therefore we  must  remind  people  that  ~urope is about 
the ordinarx but important  things  of every  day  life:  jobs, 
prices,  the range  of goods  and  services which we  buy  and 
the  quality of  the  environment in which  we  work_and  spend 
our leisure.  We  have  to  show  that in each of  these areas 
of  immediate  concern to all Europe's  citizens  the  Community 
can,  if it is permitted,  make  a  very valuable contribution. 
But  that '\vill not  • /. But  that will not be  enough.  If we  are once more 
to elicit strong and  enduring enthusiasm for  the  Community, 
we  will also have  to remind  people  that Europe is about 
extraordinary things as well.  It is all too  easy to forget 
that throughout  the area that it covers  - from Scarpa Flow 
to Sicily,  and from Bantry Bay  to Bavaria - the  Community  is 
distinguished not merely  by  the profession but also by  the 
practice of  those democratic ideals  based upon respect for 
the individual which are  among  Europe's greatest gifts to 
human  civilisation.  Free elections,  freedom of  speech, 
equality of opportunity,  equality before  the  law,  and  freedom 
from arrest without trial are rights which are the  common 
and precious  property of all the  Community's  citizens  -
and  they are rights which are  by  no  means  enjoyed universally 
elsewhere. 
The  liberal and  democratic way  of life that characterises 
modern  Europe  does  not owe  its origin to  the Community.  All  the 
Member  States were  fully fledged democracies  before  they  joined 
the  Community.  But  the  safeguarding and  enhancement  of  basic 
democratic liberties - has  from  the outset been a  paramount 
objective of  the  European adventure. 
One  of  the great and guiding insights of  the Founding 
Fathers was  their recognition that if the  leading nations 
of Europe  dared  to  transcend their ancestral rivalries and 
to  enter an entirely new  relationship in which  each brought 
the best of its individual  traditions  to  bear upon  the 
construction of a  greater whole,  then,  in addition to 
eliminating the prospect of  armed conflict between  them,  those 
nations would also  immensely  fortify the  individual rights 
and  freedoms  which  each of  them  cherished. 
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The  accuracy of this perception has  I  believe been 
amply vindicated by  subsequent events.  It has  been demonstrated 
for instance,  by  the remarkable resilience which our liberal 
institutions are currently displaying in the face  of  current 
economic problems,  in some  ways  as  intractable as  those which 
proved so damaging  to  democracy in the nineteen thirties. 
And  it has also been  shown  by  the manner in which  European 
democracy is withstanding the  terrifying epidemic of 
ruthless terrorism.  I  know  this is a  matter of particular 
concern to Germans.  But of course other countries of  the 
Community  have  the  same  problem - my  own  included  - and  we  must 
stand together in combatting the menace. 
What  the Founding Fathers failed to anticipate,  however, 
was  that While  their policies would meet with  success,  the 
attempt of others outside Western Europe  to build similarly 
sturdy democracies would all too  often meet with failure. 
Indeed  a  glance at a  list of  the world's nations  reveals 
that something like a  quarter of  the  globe's pitifully 
small  number of full democracies  are  to  be  found within the 
Community. 
In these  circumstances  the  Community  is,  I  believe, 
called upon  to undertake  a  task which understandably  the 
.  . 
Founding Fathers did not envisage.  In a  world in which  freedom 
and  democracy are rare and  frequently  ephemeral it falls  to us 
to provide an example  and an inspiration for humanity at large. 
We  must  show that freedom and  democracy  can be  achieved in 
practice on a  lasting basis.  The  particular achievement  of 
Europe will be  to  show  that this  can be  done  more  easily when 
proud nations  choose  to bury ancient animosities  in order to 
cooperate with their.neighbours. 
And  above all  ./. 1····-
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And  above all we  have  to  show  that freedom and  democracy 
are  justified by  their fruits:  that liberty under a 
democratically determined  law enables men  and women  more 
completely to realise their potential  and  to live happier 
more  fulfilled and more  useful lives  than is possible under 
any other system. 
Proving that libercy is a  prize so valuable that its 
attainment is fully worth  the  prolonged struggle which in 
many  parts of  the world it will certainly require is a 
daunting task.  But  I  am  confident that once  the  peoples 
of  the  Community  recognise  that this is  the high vocation 
to which Europe is called,  they will be prepared once more 
to give their Community  the whole-hearted and  sustained 
support it so  sorely needs. 
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Brussels,  9  March  1978 
"EUROPE  - MONEY  AND  IDEALS" 
Summary  of  a  speech  to be  given by  Christopher  Tugendhat  in Munich  on  9  March 
' 
Christopher  Tugendhat,  Member  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  will  be 
addressing  the Gesellschaft  fur  Auslandskunde  in  Munich  (Saal  des  Schweizer  Hauses, 
LeopoldstraAe)  at  18.15  hours  on  9  March  1978.  His  subject  will  be  the  European  Community 
and  issues of  special  relevance to Germany.  This  will  be  his  maiden  speech  in Germany. 
Mr  Tugendhat's  address  has  five  main  themes: 
•  Germany's  achievements  over  the  last thirty-years  and  the  importance of Germany's  role 
in the  European  Community; 
The  state of the  Community  today; 
•  German  concern  over  the  Community  budget; 
•  The  common  agricultural policy.and its cost  and  consequences  for  Germany; 
•  The  Community's  responsibility as  an  island of democracy  in the  world. 
The  summary  concentrates on  the sections of  Mr  Tugendhat's  speech  dealing  specifically 
with  Germany. 
1.  Germany's  achievements  and  her  importance  to  the  Community 
Germany  today  is one  of the  constitutional  showpieces  of the  Free  World.  Germany  has 
succeeded  in  combining  this political achievement  with  astounding  economic  success, 
a  "miracle"  when  one  remembers  that  it  was  accomplished  under  the  unbel1evably 
difficult  conditions of thirty years  ago.· Only  the  character  and  the determination of 
the German  people  and  their  leading  statesmen  made  these triumphs  possible.  "The 
effort  and  the skill which  the  citizens of  your  country  have  brought  to  the  task  of 
building  a  nation  anew  has  brought  them  great  rewards- the  blessings of  internal 
stability, the  enjoyment  of extensive civil  liberties, a  very  large  measure  of 
material  prosperity, ·and  a  place  of  honour  and  considerable  influence  among  the nations 
of the world."  The  benefits  flowing  from  Germany's  political "miracle"  reach  out 
beyond  her  frontiers:  "The  prodigious feat  of  constructing  liberal  institutions  in 
( ••• )  difficult  conditions  ( ••• ), and  then maintaining  those  institutions despite all 
the problems  that  inevitably arise from  Germany's  geographical  location on  the  extreme 
perimeter  of  the  Free  World,  has  given  invaluable encouragement  to democrats  on  both 
sides of the  Iron  Curtain." 
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But  this  inspiri~g example  is not  the only  reason  for  the gratitude  many  of  us  fee~ 
towards  Germany.  Another  is the  way  in  which  Germany  has  made  use  of  her  refound  . 
strength.  She  played  a  crucial  part  in  the  foundation  of  the  Community  and  has  sub-~ 
sequently  supported it  in  a  very  impressive  manner,  often  in  very  trying  circumstances. 
Qne  token of  ~his was  her  consistent  support  often  against  strenuous  opposition for 
Britain's accession. 
2.  Germany  and  the  Community's  budget 
Germans  tend  to  complain  that  the  Community's  budget  is grossly distended  and  that 
Germany  receives  very  Little  in  return  for  being  the  Community's  paymaster.  Are  these 
complaints  justified? 
The  Community's  budget  is  very  small  - only  about  2.5  % of  national  budgets.  In  fact 
it is  about  the  same  size  as  Bavaria's  budget.  Almost  three quarters of it goes  on  the 
common  agricultural  policy.  Such  a  budget,  which  accurately and  appropriately reflects 
the  Community's  immaturity,  Leaves  very  Little  scope  for  new  policies and  programmes. 
And  new  policies  and  programmes  are  sorely needed  if  we  are  to further  the process  of 
European  integration.  This  objective  by  no  means  implies  an  increase  in total public 
expenditure.  What  it does  imply  is the transfer of  responsibility for  tasks- and 
hence  expenditure- which~can be  performed  more  effectively and  economically at 
Community  Level  than  by  the  Member  States acting  separately.  Indeed,  far  from 
increasing total  expenditure,  such  a  transfer  may  actually  reduce  it. 
It  is obvious  from  this that  the  Community  budget  must  grow  more  rapidly  than  national 
budgets  if the  Community  is to develop  policies  and  programmes  outside  the  agricultural 
field. 
As  to  being  the  Community's  paymaster,  Germany  is not  only  the  richest  but  also - even 
in terms  of  population - the  biggest  Member  State.  This  means  that  her  contribution to 
the  Community's  budget  is automatically  larger  than  that  of partners.  At  all  events 
each  Member  State  contributes  according  to  its economic  strength.  In  per  capita terms, 
Germany  actually gets  away  more  Lightly  t~an some  other  Member  States.  In  1977  Germany' 
contribution to the  European  budget  cost  Germans  DM  149  a  head.  But  the  Belgians paid 
DM  192  and  the  Dutch  DM  205. 
It is  regrettable that  the  budget  is too  often discussed  in  terms  of  financial  return. 
The  Community  is not  the  kind  of  undertaking  that  can  be  discussed  in  terms  of  a  profiS 
and  Loss  account.  In  pooling  their  strengths  for  the  common  purpose  of  building  a  new 
and  better  Europe,  the  nine  Member  States are  engaged  upon  an  historic  venture  with  a 
much  higher  objective than  can  be  measured  in the narrowly-defined  terms  of  national 
balance  sheets.  Moreover,  many  economic  benefits  flow  from  the  Community  which  do  not 
pass  through  the  budget.  An  industrial  state  like Germany,  which  is  highly  dependent 
on  exports,  has  everything  to gain  from  the  fact  that it now  has  ~nin~errupted access 
to  the  markets  of  its main  customers. 
3.  The  common  agricultural  policy  and  its cost  and  consequences  for  Germany 
The  common  agricultural  policy  is  a  corner-stone  of  the  Community.  It  is absolutely 
essential  if our  citizens  are  to  have  guaranteed  supplies of  farm  products  at  stable 
prices.  Agricultural  policy  is  unique  in that  it  has  been  transferred  almost  entirely 
from  national  to  Community  competence.  It  is  no  accident  that  agriculture dominates 
the  Community's  budget •.  But  the  aim  now  should  be  to extend  Community  spending  in othet 
appropriate areas.  When  this  happens  the  proportion  spent  on  agriculture  will 
automatically fall.  · 
The  remorseless  rise  in agricultural  expenditure is  alarming.  !t is partly  attributabl~ 
to  enormous  market  surpluses  and  the  monetary  compensatory  arnou!lts  deriving  from  the 
green  currency  system.  We  must  call  a  halt.  The  1978  estimate  for  butter  storage  alone 
exceeds  total  appropriations  for  payment  under  the  Regional  Fund • 
. 
German  commentators  often  criticize agricultural  expenditure.  But  they  tend  to  forget 
that  Germany  herself is  largely  responsible  for  this and  that  German~'s farmers  are 
among  the  major  benefi ciaires.  A large  proportion of the  b·iggest  - and  hence  most 
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costly - surpluses, that  is to say milk,  milk  products  and  beef  and  veal,  stems  from 
German  production.  Something  like 73%  of  the  Community's  butter  stocks  and  6%  of 
its skimmed  milk  powder  stocks  are  now  held  in Germany.  Since  July 1973  22%  of total 
intervention purchases of  beef  took  place  in  Germany  and  Germany  now  holds  37  % of 
total  remaining  stocks. 
The  main  reason  for  this  is that  the play  of  the  green  currency  system  has  guaranteed 
German  farmers  more  favourable  price  levels  than  farmers  elsewhere  in the  Community. 
The  German  Government  has  persistently  refused to accept  any  revaluation of  the green 
Mark  which  was  not  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  common  prices. 
The  German  farmer  also  enjoys  a  relatively  favourable  position as  regards  imports  of 
fertilizerd  and  machinery,  since  these  are  bought  in  real  money  rather  than  "green 
money". 
It  is  by  no  means  certain that this favourable  position of German  farmers  is of  real 
e~onomic benefit  to the german  economy.  German  economists  are  now  arguing  that  for 
Germany,  as  a  net  agricultural  importer  with  a  comparative  advantage  in  industrial 
production, artificial benefits to agriculture  involve  serious misallocation of 
resources. 